Hunton Retail Law Resource

On April 25, 2022, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the plaintiff’s appeal in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the increasingly contentious “consent-by-registration” theory of personal jurisdiction. The theory deems corporate defendants to have consented to general personal jurisdiction (also known as “all-purpose” jurisdiction) in a forum based solely on its registration to conduct business there. As we reported in our February 2022 article—Mitigating ...

This week, the FTC voted 3–1 to accept a settlement agreement with MoviePass, Inc., its parent company, and two of the now-defunct company’s former employees, after allegations of data security issues and deceptive trade practices. The Commission brought an enforcement action against MoviePass pursuant to the FTC Act and the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (“ROSCA”), the latter of which requires disclosure of all material terms, a consumer’s informed consent, and a simple mechanism to stop recurring charges when marketing negative option services.

In 1973, Congress amended the FTC Act by adding §13(b), giving the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) equitable powers to remediate any violation of any law under its purview.  Using that power, the FTC has sought equitable monetary relief, including restitution and disgorgement. The lower courts routinely authorized such relief and Congress seemingly acknowledged the FTC’s power when it reauthorized the FTC Act. Despite those headwinds, today the Supreme Court unanimously held in a highly-anticipated case, AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC, that the FTC cannot seek or obtain equitable monetary relief pursuant to §13(b).

Last week the Eleventh Circuit delivered a surprising blow to class action settlement practice finding that 19th century Supreme Court precedent “prohibit[s] the type of incentive award that the district court approved here–one that compensates a class representative for his time and rewards him for bringing a lawsuit,” a type of incentive award that is “commonplace in modern class-action litigation.” Retailers and other defendants in class action cases should take note, because this ruling may impact how settlements in the Eleventh Circuit should be structured going forward.

In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com that "generic.com" marks may be registered trademarks or service marks when consumers do not perceive them as generic.

On Monday, the US Supreme Court agreed to consider whether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. It is a question on which circuits have been divided. On one hand, some courts have found that the gateway question of arbitrability—whether the claims fall within the scope of the carve-out provision—is for the arbitrator to decide. On the other, some courts have found that, where there is a carve-out provision, there is no clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator, and questions of arbitrability are to be decided by the court. Undoubtedly, resolution is necessary.

As previously reported in the Hunton Employment & Labor Perspectives Blog, last Thursday the California Supreme Court ruled that employees must be paid for time spent undergoing security checks before leaving work. The ruling comes two years after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sought guidance on this issue under California law in the case of Amanda Frlekin v. Apple Inc.  The question presented to the California Supreme Court was:  Is time spent on the employer’s premises waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices ...

Recently, in Mission Product Holdings v. Tempnology LLC, the Supreme Court held that a trademark licensee may continue using a licensed trademark after its licensor files for bankruptcy and rejects the relevant license agreement. While a debtor-licensor may “reject” a trademark license agreement under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, such rejection is only a breach of the agreement and does not allow the licensor to revoke the licensee’s rights.

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In a 5-4 decision with major implications for e-commerce retailers, the Supreme Court has closed the “online sales tax loophole” by holding that a state may collect sales tax from out-of-state sellers that do not maintain a physical presence in the state. The decision, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. et al., No. 17-494, 585 U.S. __ (2018), overturns two prior Supreme Court cases holding that an out-of-state seller’s duty to collect and remit tax to a consumer’s home state depended on whether the seller had a physical presence in that state. The Court found that this “Physical ...

On June 11, 2018, the United States Supreme Court ruled that American Pipe tolling does not extend to follow-on class actions brought after the statute of limitations period has run. This decision resolves a split between circuit courts over the question of whether a putative class member can rely on American Pipe to toll applicable statute of limitations to file a new class action in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or filing an individual action. The Court held that “American Pipe tolls the statutes of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action individually or file individual claims. But American Pipe does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations.” China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, --- S. Ct. ---, 2018 WL 2767565, at *3 (2018). 

In a major win for employers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements with class action waivers do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). As reported on the Hunton Employment & Labor Perspectives Blog, the Supreme Court’s narrow 5-4 decision paves the way for employers to include such waivers in arbitration agreements to avoid class and collective actions.

As reported on Hunton's Employment & Labor Perspectives blog, the U.S. Supreme Court has voted to hear an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc. The Supreme Court is expected to decide whether workers can pursue their claims through class-wide arbitration when the underlying arbitration agreement is silent on the issue. The case could have wide-reaching consequences for employers who use arbitration agreements.

The California Supreme Court has adopted a new three-part test to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee under California’s wage orders, which regulate wages, hours and working conditions. The highly anticipated ruling could have wide-ranging effects for businesses operating in California and beyond, as companies try to navigate the new gig economy.

Since the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)—and particularly in light of the Court’s more recent decisions in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) and BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017)—courts across the country have applied a more exacting standard for assessing whether defendants can be subject to general personal jurisdiction in a particular forum. Under this standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s contacts with the forum are so continuous and systematic as to render it “essentially at home” there. In most instances, a company is “essentially at home” only in the state where it is incorporated and the state where it operates its principal place of business. This has been a largely positive result for companies in the retail product industry that may have strategic incentive to avoid becoming subject to “all purpose” general personal jurisdiction in each state in which their products are sold.

As reported on the Hunton Privacy & Information Security Law Blog, on March 8, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) reversed a decision from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The trial court found that one subclass of plaintiffs in In re Zappos.Com, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation had not sufficiently alleged injury in fact to establish Article III standing. The opinion focused on consumers who did not allege that any fraudulent charges had been made using their identities, despite hackers accessing their names, account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card information in a 2012 data breach. 

Last week, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, became the second federal appellate court to officially recognize a discrimination claim under Title VII based solely on the plaintiff’s sexual orientation. The Court’s decision in Zarda v. Altitude Express follows on the heels of the Seventh Circuit’s decision last April in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, in which the Seventh Circuit also overturned its prior cases to recognize protections based on sexual orientation under Title VII.

In a highly anticipated opinion, a Federal Judge in California ruled in favor of GrubHub, an internet food ordering service, finding it properly classified a delivery driver as an independent contractor.

In Lawson v. GrubHub, the plaintiff, a delivery driver, alleged that GrubHub violated California’s minimum wage, overtime and employee expense reimbursement laws by misclassifying him as an independent contractor when he was really an employee. He brought the case on behalf of himself and as a representative action pursuant to the California Private Attorney General Act.

On June 19, 2017, the United States Supreme Court announced important constitutional limitations on state courts’ ability to exercise specific jurisdiction over nonresidents’ claims against out-of-state defendants. The Court’s nearly unanimous decision in Bristol-Myers v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. (2017) has potentially far-reaching implications for companies facing claims brought by nonresident and resident plaintiffs in states in which those companies are neither incorporated nor maintain their principal place of business. In holding that mere joinder of nonresident plaintiffs’ claims with those of resident plaintiffs does not permit a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the Court’s decision is the latest in a trend of important personal jurisdiction decisions rendered by the high court in recent years which provide companies with significant constitutional protections in terms of where plaintiffs may force companies to litigate.

A year ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins that a plaintiff must do more than plead a mere statutory procedural violation to establish standing; to plead an injury in fact, a plaintiff also must allege a harm that is both “concrete” and “particularized.” Two recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit—one involving a rare written dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc—demonstrate the continuing difficulties courts are facing in determining what constitutes a concrete injury under Spokeo. They suggest that the Eleventh Circuit is most likely to find standing for violations of statutes that are intended to protect personal privacy or create a right to information, although judges do not always agree as to which statutes fall within these categories.

As reported on the Hunton Employment & Labor Law Perspectives blog, the United States Supreme Court has granted consolidated review of three cases to determine whether arbitration agreements that waive employees’ rights to participate in a class action lawsuit against their employer are unlawful. The Court’s decision to address the uncertainty surrounding class action waivers of employment claims follows a circuit split last year in which the Fifth and Eighth circuits upheld such waivers and the Seventh and Ninth circuits found that such waivers violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Given the increasingly widespread use of class action waivers by employers to stem costly class and collective actions, the high court’s ruling is likely to have a significant nationwide impact.

On January 13, 2017, the United States Supreme Court agreed to resolve the question of whether class action waivers in the employment context violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The decision will have far-reaching consequences for retailers who include such waivers in employee arbitration agreements in an effort to limit class action exposure. 

In August 2016, the Supreme Court of California issued its decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, which – as detailed more fully in our earlier post – features an expansive interpretation of specific personal jurisdiction that is difficult to reconcile with the U.S. Supreme Court’s general personal jurisdiction decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Those decisions significantly limited the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over defendant corporations to their state of incorporation and principal place of business unless “exceptional circumstances” exist. 

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014), numerous courts across the country have applied its holding to narrow the permissible bounds of the exercise of general jurisdiction over companies in jurisdictions without a connection to the specific claims in the case. On August 29, 2016, in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, No. S221038 (Calif. 2016), the California Supreme Court left many wondering what Daimler may mean for the exercise of specific jurisdiction in cases involving nationwide courses of business conduct affecting both resident and nonresident plaintiffs. 

This past week, several consumer protection and regulatory actions made headlines:

Court of Appeals Rules Spokeo Requires Actual Harm

A three-judge appellate panel dismissed the case in Hancock et al. v. Urban Outfitters, a putative class action against two retailers, Urban Outfitters and Anthropologie, who were alleged to have violated District of Columbia consumer protection laws by seeking consumers’ zip code information.

The tidal wave of New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) claims just swept up a novel argument: a class complaint against Facebook, Inc. argues that the popular social media site’s terms of use is subject to TCCWNA because Facebook profits from users’ personal information and intellectual property.

TCCWNA. The very acronym evokes head scratches and sighs of angst and frustration amongst many lawyers in the retail industry. You have probably heard about it. You may have even been warned about it. And you may currently be trying to figure out how best to minimize your risk and exposure this very moment. But what is it and why has virtually every retailer been hit with a TCCWNA class action demand letter or lawsuit in the past few months? And why are most retailers scrambling to update the terms and conditions of their websites?

As we previously reported, the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo v. Robins has been nearly universally lauded by defense counsel as a new bulwark against class actions alleging technical violations of federal statutes. It may be that. But Spokeo also poses a significant threat to defendants by defeating their ability to remove exactly the types of cases that defendants most want in federal court. The decision circumscribes the federal jurisdiction, with all its advantages, that defendants have enjoyed under Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) for the past decade.

On May 16, 2016, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Case No. 13-1339, a case that businesses and the plaintiffs’ bar have been following closely, due largely to its potential effect on class actions predicated on alleged statutory violations and seeking solely statutory damages. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that a plaintiff must do more than plead a statutory procedural violation to establish standing; to plead an injury in fact, a plaintiff also must allege a harm that is both “concrete” and “particularized.” However, the Court did not apply its holding to the facts, instead remanding for further analysis by the Ninth Circuit. While both plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense attorneys are claiming a “victory,” Spokeo provides some ammunition for businesses that find themselves facing so-called “no-injury” class action lawsuits predicated on consumer protection statutes. 

The due date for the next Form SD filing for those public companies required to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on the inclusion of conflict minerals in their products is May 31, 2016.

Background

In response to a challenge of the SEC conflict minerals rule by a coalition of trade associations, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion in April 2014. That opinion upheld parts of the rule, but also effectively struck down on First Amendment grounds the portion of the rule that required companies to describe their products as “DRC Conflict Free,” “DRC conflict undeterminable” or “not found to be ‘DRC Conflict Free,’ ” as the case may be. On rehearing in August 2015, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its April 2014 decision. The D.C. Circuit then denied an SEC and NGO’s petition for rehearing en banc the following November. Finally, in March 2016, Attorney General Loretta Lynch notified Congress that the federal government would not petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The deadline to file the petition passed in April. Thus, the appellate process has been exhausted.

On May 2, 2016, the Supreme Court declined to review the D.C. Circuit’s January 2015 ruling upholding a 2013 FTC decision finding that POM Wonderful, LLC (“POM”) misled consumers in advertising that its 100% Pomegranate Juice and POMx supplements could prevent, treat or reduce the risk of prostate cancer, heart disease and erectile dysfunction.

This past week, the following consumer protection actions made headlines:

FTC Reminds Consumers to Watch for Misleading Sales; Warns Retailers of the Same

In a recent consumer information piece, the FTC sought to warn consumers of misleading “sales.” Of concern to consumers and the FTC are advertisements or in-store tags that suggest a consumer will save on a product, when in reality the consumer will pay full price and the promised discount is applied on a future purchase.

The FTC also published a warning to retailers that offers must be sufficiently transparent for consumers to be able to determine the final price of a product or service.

We previously reported on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), wherein a 6-3 majority held that “an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case.” As part of its decision, however, the Supreme Court expressly left open one critical question: whether a defendant can moot a case by tendering—as opposed to simply offering—complete relief to the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit has now weighed in on that issue and has answered that question in the negative.

This past week, the following regulatory and consumer actions made headlines:

U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Procter & Gamble’s Challenge on “Snake Oil” Claim

Procter & Gamble’s (“P&G’s”) efforts to get the U.S. Supreme Court to review an Ohio federal judge’s class certification finding ended when the high court denied certiorari in The Procter & Gamble Co. v. Dino Rikos, thereby upholding the Sixth Circuit’s 2-1 decision.

This week, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 2010 Colorado law (Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-21-112.3.5) requiring out-of-state retailers that do not collect sales tax from Colorado consumers to report transactions to state taxing authorities, in an effort to boost state “use tax” compliance. The Colorado statute requires out-of-state retailers to (1) remind consumers with each transaction that their purchase may be subject to state “use tax” laws; (2) deliver an “annual purchase summary” to any customers with transactions totaling greater than $500 in any year; and (3) annually report the transaction information to state taxing authorities. There is an exception for "retailers who made less than $100,000 in total gross sales in Colorado in the previous calendar year, and who reasonably expect gross sales in the current calendar year to be less than $100,000."

As reported on the Hunton Employment and Labor Law Blog, the United States Supreme Court has denied a restaurant manager’s petition seeking review of whether parties may stipulate to the dismissal with prejudice of a lawsuit alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), or whether judicial or Department of Labor (“DOL”) approval is a prerequisite to such a dismissal, as the Second Circuit held in his case, Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc. Having declined the petition for writ of certiorari, FLSA lawsuits will remain more difficult to resolve for employers in New York, Connecticut and Vermont.

As reported on the Hunton Employment Labor and Law Blog, on January 20, 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, No. 14-857 (U.S.), in which a 6-3 majority held that “an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case,” thus resolving an ongoing split among the Circuits on this issue. While this is seemingly a positive development for the plaintiffs’ bar, the Court expressly left open one critical question that is almost sure to be revisited: whether a defendant can moot a case by tendering—as opposed to simply offering—complete relief to the plaintiff.

Yesterday, the US Supreme Court in Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, No. 13-720 (June 22, 2015), upheld the longstanding precedent provided by Brulotte v. Thys Co, 379 U.S. 29 (1964), which stated that “a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.” Id. at 32. Justice Kagan, writing the opinion of the Court, stated that stare decisis requires the Court to adhere to the decision in Brulotte.

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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected a liability insurer’s attempt to overturn a Superior Court decision holding that insurers must defend product liability claims. See Indalex v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 126 WAL 2014 (Pa. Sept. 18, 2014). The decision confirms that loss arising from a defective product may constitute an “occurrence” triggering general liability insurance coverage under Pennsylvania law.

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The Supreme Court during its 2013–14 term decided on six patent cases, the last on June 19, 2014. These cases will have significant consequences for companies as they work to advance their strategy for protecting their intellectual property. The attached client alert provides highlights of each case.

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